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# Hopes of US-Soviet detente seem dim

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WASHINGTON — No matter who becomes the next leader of the USSR, it is very unlikely that Soviet arms and arms-control policy will change much this year, according to a variety of specialists on Soviet politics.

"During a succession," says Adam Ulam, director of Harvard University's Russian Research Center, "things are usually put on hold. It takes not just the election of the general secretary [of the Communist Party's Central Committee], but also [time] for him to consolidate his power. That takes about a year or two. I don't expect much to change in the meantime."

Many analysts expect the Soviet military to gain more power inside the Kremlin, and thus for prospects of US-Soviet detente to suffer, at least in the short term.

Says Jonathan Sanders of Columbia University's W. Averell Harriman Institute, "No one's going to get in without at least the acquiescence, if not the support, of the military. Certainly [Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri] Ustinov played a primary role in [the rise of Yuri] Andropov."

"Politics in the Kremlin are often Byzantine, replete with factions and conspiratorial struggle. This is particularly true when the Politburo selects a new leader. The military's role as power broker in this process depends on the strength and cohesiveness of the other players."

Richard D. Anderson, a former Soviet analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency now at the University of California at Berkeley, says that if the next leader "could get a sufficient majority in the Politburo, he could ignore the military. But the problem is that the Politburo now is fractured; there is no single machine that dominates, so the military becomes important." Even the loose coalition that rules was put together mainly through the efforts of Ustinov. The military's role in the post-Andropov succession struggle, therefore, might even be stronger than usual.

## Offers in exchange for support

Anderson also believes that even before Andropov's death, "the balance of power in the Politburo had already shifted in favor of people who had no commitment to detente." During the political struggle for the post of general secretary after Leonid Brezhnev's death in November 1982, Anderson says that "in order to acquire power and to keep it ... [Andropov] had to offer something to [certain members of the Politburo] in exchange for

their support."

His offer included promotions of four party and government officials with whom, Anderson says, Andropov had some policy disagreements. All four — Grigory V. Romanov, who became a party secretary; Vitaly Vorotnikov, now premier of the Russian federation; Geldar Aliyev, first deputy premier; and Mikhail Solomentsev, on the party control commission — are "hard-line ideologues," basically uninterested in foreign policy, generally opposed to detente.

Anderson's analysis is not accepted by all other experts. Some believe, for example, that the four men promoted may have been allies of Andropov. In the often opaque, at best translucent world of Kremlin politics, no one can know for sure.

Still, there is general agreement among specialists that in its initial months in power the new Soviet leadership will probably increase defense spending and be disinclined, even if the leader himself is willing, to reopen arms-control talks.

Says Raymond Garthoff of the Brookings Institution, who has spoken with Soviet officials on many occasions, most recently last fall, "I have a strong feeling that at this point in Moscow there will be a reluctance to make new initiatives for fear the West will see them as signs of weakness."

William E. Griffith of MIT agrees, saying, "It will be very difficult to make a major decision, such as suddenly changing the current general line that Reagan is hopeless [to do business with]."